Introduction
Back in the 1960s, the question of optimal choice of production techniques was at heart of the heated "Cambridge-Cambridge" controversy related to the underpinnings of the concept of physical capital (see e.g., Harcourt, 1972 , for a summary). Later on, however, the macroeconomics profession has broadly agreed to base their further investigations either on the neoclassical assumption of a Cobb-Douglas aggregate production function or on the postulate of purely labor-augmenting technical change, given their analytical convenience, consistency with balanced growth (Uzawa, 1961 ) and a range of frequently invoked stylized facts (Kaldor, 1961) . The question of endogeneous technology choice has naturally lost its footing under such a paradigm. However, recent literature has uncovered ample evidence against the empirical validity of these assumptions (e.g., Klump Given this background, the contribution of the current article is to propose a simple framework for modeling endogeneous factor-augmenting technology choice by monopolistically competitive firms. In its core, it is a substantial extension and reinterpretation of the model discussed recently by Growiec (2011) , who used it to provide a microfoundation for the aggregate CES production function. 1 The key advantage of that approach lies with its ability to yield direct results on firms' optimal factor-augmenting technology choices, and that it naturally accomodates heterogeneity across sectors (with the symmetric case being an interesting benchmark) and factor-augmenting technical change (with Hicks-neutral technical change being a natural point of reference). It is also sufficiently tractable, interpretable, and generalizable to be available as a building block of a variety of embedding structures. In particular, it could help address questions Introduction N a t i o n a l B a n k o f P o l a n d 4 1 regarding:
• input misallocation and the related technical inefficiency across sectors and coun- In all these issues, endogeneous technology choice by firms is clearly an important part of the mechanism at work.
Following the direct predecessors of our current modeling approach, we allow firms to choose their preferred factor-augmenting technologies optimally from a parametrically specified technology menu whose shape is determined by the R&D sector (which we tentatively consider to be exogeneous here). This shape is isoelastic, consistent with the assumption that the underlying unit factor productivities (UFPs) are independently Weibull-distributed across the available technologies.
2 As opposed to the earlier contributions, however, the current article considers an economy with a continuum of monopolistically competitive producers of differentiated intermediate goods whose output is assembled into a unique consumption good using a CES technology, as in the standard model of monopolistic competition (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977 Viewed from a different perspective, the contribution of this paper to the literature can also be interpreted as a positive one. Indeed, in the current paper we have arguably identified two plausible mechanisms of endogeneous technology choice at the firm level, which are able to disentangle the distribution of output across firms and production inputs from the aggregate quantities and their dynamics.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 lays out the framework.
Section 3 presents the results. Section 4 concludes.
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where the factor-specific parameter λ ai identifies the degree of augmentation of each i-th intermediate good along the technology menu, α defines the curvature of the menu, and N defines its location.
The technology menu, parametrically specified above, 4 can be understood as a contour line of the cumulative distribution function of the joint distribution of unit factor productivities (UFPs)ã i . Under independence of all dimensions (so that marginal distributions are multiplied by one another), equation (1) 
where all a i > 0. Under such parametrization, we have
and thus the location parameter N in equation (1) is interpreted as 
where the variables with the subscript 0 are evaluated at the normalization point in time t 0 , at which equation (4) 
Final goods producers are assumed to be perfectly competitive, and thus they decide 
Second order conditions require us to assume that α > θ > 0, so that the interior stationary point of the above optimization problem is a maximum. Moreover, for the resultant aggregate production function to be concave with respect to x i , we need to assume also that α − θ − αθ > 0. In other words, the curvature parameter of the technology menu α must be large enough to exceed
Since final goods producers are perfectly competitive, in equilibrium their profits are zero, which implies:
Intermediate goods producers
Intermediate goods producers are assumed to operate a linear technology using labor only, paying their employees the market wage w which they take as given. Each i-th good is produced by a monopolist who can freely decide upon the price of her good q i subject to the demand curve defined by final goods producers. In case (IG), she also chooses her favorite factor-augmenting technology a i . 
considering the impact of their own choice q i on aggregate output X as negligible. 
considering the impact of their own choices (a i , q i ) on aggregate output X as negligible.
Monopolistically competitive intermediate goods producers will achieve positive profits in equilibrium.
Equilibrium
The model can be closed in numerous ways. Here we provide it with a simple static closure in order to display the salient features of the proposed framework as transparently as possible. Henceforth we assume that all output X is immediately consumed at all times t, so that X t ≡ C t . We also assume that technological progress takes the form of exogeneous growth in the parameters λ ai , governing the shape of the technology menu at each t. 6 We also assume (tentatively) that labor supply is fixed and normalized to one, L ≡ 1, and adopt the following definition of equilibrium.
6 Alternatively one could, e.g., provide the model with a dynamic edge by assuming that households who own the monopolistically competitive intermediate goods producers, maximize the discounted stream of utility. They could also endogenously decide on the amount of R&D devoted to increasing each of λ ai 's. There is also a possibility to introduce stochastic factors into the R&D sector, so that the distribution of λ ai 's (and thus the distribution of all other variables) could be driven by a stochastic R&D process.
The framework N a t i o n a l B a n k o f P o l a n d
10

2
Definition 1 In case FG, the equilibrium is a collection
• optimization problems (6) and (9) are solved,
• the wage rate w is set so that markets clear.
In case IG, the equilibrium is a collection
that:
• optimization problems (7) and (10) 
Optimal technology choice
The proposed framework provides direct results on the firms' optimal factor-augmenting technology choices. Curiously, thanks to the isoelastic character of the derived demand curves, these choices are exactly the same regardless of whether final or intermediate goods firms make them (whether the technologies are embodied in intermediate goods or in the methods of assembling them). In particular, for both cases (FG) and (IG) we find that at time t 0 , when X = X 0 , x i = x 0i , and λ ai = λ a0i for all i ∈ [0, A], the optimal technology choice satisfies:
where λ a0i is the value of λ ai at time t 0 . Values of a * 0i will be used as a 0i in the normalization at the local level in all subsequent derivations. Keeping this normalization assumption in mind, we find the following result: Proposition 1 (Cases FG and IG) For any moment in time t ̸ = t 0 , the optimal technology choices are:
At this point, we shall make the following definition which will be useful in our further calculations:
The term Φ j can be interpreted as the inverse of the relative supply of j-th intermediate good as compared to all other goods, specified in efficient units, i.e., in units proportional to the parameter λ aj describing the augmentation of j-th good along the technology menu. In the symmetric case where Φ i = Φ j for any i ̸ = j, Φ j reduces to unity. This Results N a t i o n a l B a n k o f P o l a n d 12 3 term will be used later to determine the lack of impact of dispersion across sectors on the aggregate variables and their dynamics: Φ j defines the distributions of all quantities across firms but disappears upon aggregation.
The aggregate production function
Inserting the optimal technology choices, derived in the previous subsection, into the "local" production technology, i.e., computing the convex hull of "local" production functions given by equation (4), we obtain the following aggregation result.
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Proposition 2 (Cases FG and IG) The aggregate production function, taking optimal factor-augmenting technology choices into account, is of normalized CES form:
This aggregation result has three crucial properties. First, the aggregate production function inherits the CES form of the "local" production technology (Growiec, 2011) .
Second, it implies that the aggregate elasticity of substitution σ = We also note the following corollary.
Corollary 1 The income share of each i-th intermediate good is equal to:
It is a substantial analytical advantage of the current framework that it disentangles endogeneous factor-augmenting technology choice from the choice of quantities x i and prices q i . In addition, the former is also independent of who picks the UFPs a i , i.e., whether the monopoly power enjoyed by intermediate goods producers extends to the freedom of technology choice or not. This result is a consequence of the isoelastic character of the derived demand curves and the independence of the technology menu of x i and q i .
The demand curve
Solving for the first order conditions of the maximization problem of final goods firms, the following isoelastic demand curves are derived: 
Proposition 3 (Case FG) If final goods producers pick (a i ) i∈[0,A] optimally, then their demand curve for intermediate goods takes the form:
x i (q i ) = [ 1 q i X αθ α−θ 0 X α−θ−αθ α−θ π 0i ( λ ai x 0i λ a0i ) αθ α−θ ] α−θ α−θ−αθ .(16x i (a i , q i ) = [ 1 q i X θ 0 X 1−θ π 0i ( a i x 0i a 0i ) θ ] 1 1−θ .(17)
Supply and pricing of intermediate goods
Solving for the first order condition of the profit maximization problem of each i-th intermediate goods producer, subject to the demand curve derived just above, we obtain the following optimal prices and supplied quantities:
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One natural result (cf. Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977 ) is that since all monopolists pay their workers the same equilibrium wage w, they will also necessarily demand the same price q i for a unit of the produced intermediate good,
It is also not surprising that this price is set at a fixed proportional markup over the monopolist's marginal cost w.
Consequently, optimal monopoly profits satisfy z i = α−θ−αθ αθ wx i in case (FG) and
wx i in case (IG). Thus in both cases we obtain
. In consequence, at each moment in time monopoly profits are proportionally larger in case (IG) where the technology choice is on the side of monopolists than in case (FG) where they take the technology choice as given. Across time, however, the evolution of profits (and output) is exactly parallel, so that the ratios
are equal in both cases.
Finally, looking at cross-demand
enables us to establish that
which, coupled with the assumption of a fixed labor supply,
Equilibrium
Let us now compute the equilibrium wage w and infer all remaining aggregate quantities.
From the equilibrium condition X = ∫ A 0 q i x i di, holding for all t, we obtain the following:
The wage rate equals:
in case (FG) and w = θX (21) in case (IG).
Thus, taking the normalization moment in time t 0 , it is also true that w 0 = ( αθ α−θ ) X 0 in case (FG) and w 0 = θX 0 in case (IG). Consequently, for both cases we have the following dynamic relationship:
It follows that the wage rate is proportionally larger in case (FG) than in case (IG). This is not surprising since in case (IG), monopoly power of intermediate goods producerswho are also the only employers of labor in this model -is extended also to technology choice, which is then used as an additional tool for extracting the surplus from the employees. The dynamic evolution of wages is exactly parallel in both cases, though.
As far as monopoly profits are concerned, we obtain:
Proposition 8 The aggregate monopoly profit of intermediate goods producers satisfies:
in case (FG) and
in case (IG).
Hence in both cases markets clear, so that the entire output X is distributed between the remuneration of workers and monopoly profits, only that the share of the latter is relatively larger in case (IG):
Also, the dynamic evolution of aggregate monopoly profit exactly parallels the evolution of aggregate output:
Looking at cross-demand
again and taking the above aggregate results into account, it is easily verified that:
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Using these optimal supply decisions and the inverse relative efficient supply of re- 
The shares of intermediate goods π i satisfy:
The supplied quantities of intermediate goods satisfy:
Monopoly profits are equal to:
Cross-sectional distributions
As is apparent from equation (27), the framework provides clear predictions on crosssectional distributions of all variables. More precisely, we find that the distributions of
, a i are determined in a crucial way by two elements:
• the relative pace of factor-augmenting technological progress, expanding the available technology menu, captured by growth of λ ai relative to λ aj , where j ̸ = i.
Quite naturally, if the initial distribution is uniform, π 0i = π 0j for all i ̸ = j, then the initial distribution of all key variables of the model is uniform as well, and all heterogeneity across sectors must come from the second channel. Conversely, if the growth rate of all λ ai 's is the same, and thus accounting for endogeneous technology choice we have Hicks-neutral technical change in equilibrium, then the initial distribution
is maintained for all t, so that all heterogeneity must come from the first channel. Otherwise, if technical change is not Hicks-neutral, then the cross-sectional distributions will evolve over time, driven uniquely by the evolution of {Φ i } i∈[0,A] .
Dynamics
The framework also provides clear predictions on the growth rates of aggregate variables as well as their disaggregate counterparts, based on equations (22), (26), (28), (30), and (31). We find that the growth rates of X, Z, w, x i , z i , π i , a i are determined in a crucial way by two elements:
• the average rate of factor-augmenting technological progress (as captured byλ a , the average growth rate of λ ai 's) which determines the growth rate of all aggregate variables: output X, wage w, and total monopoly profit Z,
• the relative pace of technological progress augmenting each specific i-th good (as captured by the growth rate of λ ai relative toλ a ), which determines the relative rise or fall in x i , z i , π i , a i compared to the economy-wide average. , for which the following is satisfied:
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Otherwise, if technical change is not purely Hicks-neutral in equilibrium, then the dynamics of the quantity of each intermediate good produced x i as well as the respective monopoly profits z i will follow directly the dynamics of its factor share π i . All of them will simultaneously increase if and only if λ ai grows faster than average, and decrease if λ ai grows slower than average.
